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Anchor aware!

INTRODUCTION

A 30,000 GT bulk carrier was anchored off a South East Asian port awaiting a berthing slot. Upon receiving permission to proceed into port the vessel prepared to manoeuvre from its anchorage position toward the pilot boarding area.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Upon receiving instruction from the bridge the anchor party, consisting of the chief officer and the bosun, started to raise the starboard anchor.

As the anchor came up to two shackles in the water it appeared to be stuck fast on an obstruction and was unable to heaved up further. The chief officer immediately reported this to the master and ceased heaving.

After discussions regarding the situation the decision was made to try and free the anchor by manoeuvring the vessel, walking back the anchor and then re-heaving. After a few such attempts it became increasingly clear that alternative arrangements would be needed to free the anchor.

The master decided that an inspection of the fouled anchor by drivers was necessary. Arrangements for an underwater inspection were made and the vessel sat at anchor awaiting the drivers.

Soon afterwards an explosion off its starboard bow threw a huge plume of water into the air and shook the vessel violently.

On witnessing the explosion the master made the decision to slip the fouled anchor and proceed to an alternative anchorage away from the immediate vicinity.

The subsequent investigation found that the vessel (while performing its anchoring manoeuvre) had dragged its anchor across a newly constructed gas pipeline causing a rupture and the escape of a vast quantity of gas.

WHAT DO THE REGULATION SAY?

ISM

Section 3 provides that the Company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are provided for the effective operation of the vessel and personnel, through the Designated Person Ashore.

The safe navigation of the vessel is covered by the concept of key shipboard operations within Section 7, and so the Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate.

ICS

The Bridge Procedures Guide published by the International Chamber of Shipping provides detailed guidance to best watchkeeping practices and also covers the provision of effective bridge resource management and the conduct of the bridge team.

SOLAS

Chapter V Safety of Navigation:

Regulation 20 requires that a vessel shall have onboard adequate and up-to-date charts, Sailing Directions, Notices to Mariners and other publications necessary for the intended voyage.

Regulation 4 provides a responsibility for all contracting Governments to promulgate all dangers to navigation, and this is achieved through the issuance of  Navigational Warnings which comply with the IMO/IHO World-Wide Navigational Warning Service resolution A.706 (17), as amended.

Regulation 8-2 states that contracting governments shall provide VTS, within IMO guidelines, to protect the safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation and the protection of the marine environment where the provision of such services is deemed to be justified by the degree of risk.

WHAT LESSON CAN WE LEARN?

After the event the navigation chart in use at the time of the incident was examined and it was found that no pipelines in the vicinity were shown. It transpired that corrections to place this newly constructed pipeline upon the chart had not yet been added by the second officer.

It later emerged that the vessel had not received the corrections for the chart and that the corrections packs were awaiting the vessels arrival in port, along with the rest of the ship’s mail.

It is imperative that the navigational charts and publications should be corrected and companies must provide their vessels with all publications and corrections as promptly as possible.

Due to the lack of corrections on board the navigational officers should have checked their GMDSS equipment, through either NAVTEX, World-Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS) or International safetyNET, for any navigation warnings regarding the port.

The use of all sources of available information is vital in guarding against errors. A thorough passage planning process should identify all contemporary sources of guidance throughout the entire voyage – in this case the second officer should have supplied the other navigation officers with the information required to safely navigate the vessel.

The port authorities should have effectively monitored the anchoring position of the vessel, however the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) available to vessels visiting the port was of extremely limited sophistication, and provided no radar coverage of the anchorages.

The provision of a VTS system, should supply navigational guidance to vessels entering the port, to provide assistance and also to mitigate the risks posed by such vessels – in this instance had the port authorities been able to effectively monitor the vessel’s movements into a restricted area the incident could have been avoided.