PIRACY A SERIOUS THREAT

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In the United Nations convention on the law of the sea (Article 101) the piracy is defined as follows

a)     Any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation; committed for private ends by the crew or the  passengers of a private ship or aircraft ; and directed:

1)    On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft.

2)    Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.

b)    Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or often aircraft with knowledge of facts makes it a private ship or aircraft.

c)     Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub paragraph a or b.

PIRACY IN SOMALIA:

·        Piracy off the Somali coast has been a threat to International shipping since the beginning of Somalia’s civil war.

·        With the chaotic state of Somalia and the lack of central government, combined with Somalia’s location at the horn of Africa, conditions were ripe for the growth of piracy.

·        Precise data on the economic situation in Somalia is scarce but with an estimated per capita GDP of $600/year, it remains one of the world’s poorest countries.

·        Millions of Somalis depend on world food aid.

·        These factors and the lucrative success of many hijacking operations have drawn a number of young men toward gangs of pirates whose wealth and strength often make them part of the local social and economic elite.

When a ship is attacked by pirates the parties who have responsibilities to deal with the piracy are.,

1.     The Somalia government.

2.     The Flag state of the vessel.

3.     The government of the people on board the hijacked vessel.

4.     The ship owner.

5.     The cargo owner.

The relatives of the people on board the hijacked vessel

CONSTRAINTS OF THE SOMALIA GOVT TO FIGHT AGAINST THE PIRACY:

·        Piracy off the Somali coast has been a threat to international shipping since the beginning of Somalia’s Civil War in the early 1990s. 

·        Somalia has had no effective Government since 1991.

·        At present the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is the internationally recognised govt of Somalia. The Govt is backed by Ethiopia, US and the UN.

·        Somalia became a pirate state without any form of real Govt, little industry and wrecked economy for long a time.

·        There is no administrative will to put an end to this destructive business rather there could be possible support to or links with them.

·        What is boosting piracy to remain a problem off the coast of Somalia is the continued violence and chaos on land , as in such situations procurement of weapons becomes easy with authorities unmindful of the need to stop them on land or at sea.

·        Unemployment and poverty due to which the young people in Somalia get into this criminal act which yields a huge amount as Ransom.

·        The high level of lawlessness off the long eastern Somali coast line reflects the extent of chaos there has been on the ground in the country for more than a generation.

·        In fact, resolving the Somali kind of piracy upsurge calls for a strong willed local Govt that can root out pirates from their land bases.

CONSTRAINTS OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS (FLAG STATE, GOVT OF THE PEOPLE ON BOARD...)

                                    CONSTRAINTS

                                                                RIGHT OF A SOVERIGHN STATE   

                                                                 POLITICAL WILL OF THE CONCERNED COUNTRY

                                                                 INADEQUACY OF DOMESTIC LAW

COORDINATED COOPERATION FROM ALL                                               DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

                                                                 COST INVOLVED IN MILITARY OPERATION.                  

                                                                 LARGER SOMALI COASTAL AREA

                                                                 FEAR OF ANY MAJOR MARINE POLLUTION

LEGAL PERMISSION FROM UN TO ENTER        TERRITORIAL WATERS.

·        International Law of the sea states that Vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the state whose flag they fly.

·        According to International law of the sea no country shall enter or deploy their naval ships or military air craft into the territorial sea of any other nation, in this case Somalia as this will violate both Somalia’s Sovereignty and international law.

·        All states have a duty to co-operate the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. In Somalia vessels have been hijacked and kept anchored in Somalia’s territorial waters.   

·        Some countries like India for instance, have vacillated on this issue.

·        There are many possible reasons for such hesitation. One could be the fear of failure.

·        The probability of damage or sinking of a ship carrying sensitive/inflammable cargo may be quite unnerving to any policy-maker.

·        In addition are the international ramifications of the death of a foreign national among the multinational crew onboard.

·        During a recent incident when the French Navy chased and killed Somali pirates over land, the Somali government alleged that five innocent civilians were also killed in the operation.

·        Any major intervention in the Somali piracy means a huge military action and no country is willing to undertake such an action without clearly defined legal permission to do so.

·        Other governments may have jurisdiction to arrest and extradite or try alleged offenders when they are found in their territories or onboard vessels having their nationality.

However, the prosecution of such offenders will not be easy  as a result of the inadequate extra territorial scope of the state’s criminal jurisdiction, the absence or inadequacy of extradition agreements or the lack of political will to act decisively against terrorist or pirates.

·        The legal confusion extends to what happens once pirates have been caught. In theory, any nation can shoulder the burden of prosecution. In fact, few are eager or ready to do so. Prosecuting pirates puts enormous strain on a country’s legal system.

·        The swath of piracy – affected area adjoining the Somali sea front   is too large to be kept under surveillance by dozen war ships with their integral Helicopter.

·        The high density of shipping and other maritime activity in the Aden would make it extremely difficult for the war ship to distinguish pirate vessels from benign shipping activity.

·        Furthermore, the victim vessels do not remain in international waters for long. The pirates force the crew to dock or anchor the vessels in Somali territorial waters.

THE MAIN CONSTRAINTS ARE;

·        The huge military action required to fight against the Somali pirates as they are equipped with latest and heavy ammunition.

·        The cooperation and consent required from all interested and capable nations as this operation cannot be single handedly conducted due to large area of Somalia coast and Gulf of Aden.

·        The inadequacy of the government’s domestic criminal law to try these pirates. The law of the country has to be changed to try the pirates who were captured in the territorial waters of Somalia.

·        The political will of the country. For Example in case of Stolt Valor the plea made by maritime industries to the Indian Govt was turned down initially as the Vessel is a Japanese owned vessel and registered in Hong Kong and hijacked in Somalian waters. So their question was how does the Indian Govt come in to picture?

CONSTRAINTS OF THE SHIP OWNER TO DEAL WITH THE PIRACY:

·        The ship owners have to pay more insurance premium for the ships transiting through the piracy affected area of Gulf of Aden.

·        The crew on board may not be willing to sail along the Gulf of Aden. So the owner has to pay extra allowance for people on board or divert the ship around the Cape of Good Hope.  

·        This will eventually increase the fuel consumption and transport costs.

·        The ship owner has to train the people on board transiting through Gulf of Aden about,    preventing pirates gaining access to the ship, how to make it difficult for pirates to enter accommodation and to maintain control over navigation.

·        The ship owner may have to employ additional trained crew for the lookout while sailing in that area.

·        As in the case of Stolt Valor the ship owner is Japanese but the vessel is registered and technically managed from Hong Kong and the recruitment agency is in India.

·        The people working on board were from four different nations.

·        The cargo carried on board may be owned by some other person other than the ship owner and may be a national of some other country.

·        The fact is that the Governments are not ready to swing into action by the kidnapping of foreign interests or if the vessel is owned locally , flagged with another state.

·        Due to the fragmented nature of the shipping industry the ship owners could not strongly urge the UN or developed countries to take immediate action against the piracy in Somalia and off the Somalia coast.

·        The shipping business involves multi nationals and the ship owner and the flag state may be of different countries. So that in dealing with matters like piracy in Somalia needs the inter governmental cooperation and the political will of the concerned countries.

CONSTRAINTS OF A CARGO OWNER TO DEAL WITH PIRACY:

·        The cargo owner may be forced to take additional insurance cover for his cargo carried along the Somali coast.

·        The cargo owner may have to pay increased premium for his cargo, carried through Gulf of Aden.

·        He can avoid carrying cargo through the piracy affected area and divert it around Cape of Good hope.

·        This will eventually make the cargo owner’s cost of transporting more.

CONSTRAINTS OF A RELATIVE OF A PERSON ON BOARD THE VESSEL TO DEAL WITH PIRACY:

·        The shipping business involves multi national interests.

·        As the multinational interests are involved in ships the inter governmental cooperation is very important.

·        As the ransom is demanded against the life of people on board the relatives have to appeal and bring the seriousness of the issue to all the countries to save their interest.

·        In the Stolt Valor case, there were 22 crew members onboard among them 18 Indians, 1 Russian, 2 Phillipinos and 1 Bangladesi.

·        The vessel is owned by Japanese owner. The technical management is done by a Hong Kong company-Fleet management. The vessel is on charter to Stolt tankers B.V.

·        Ebony ship management, in India is the recruitment agency.

·        The relatives of the on board people have to make efforts to bring the attention of the government ,flag state, ship owner , the agency and the media for the positive relief of people.

·        The relatives of the crew onboard and the agency appealed to the govt of India through D.G.shipping and all possible channels. Then active participation in the various peace/torch marches at Delhi/Mumbai along with families and unions to raise awareness about the incident in the eyes of Indian government, media and people.

·        The M.D of fleet management along with the govt delegation had a meeting with the ship owner and his representatives at the Indian embassy in Tokyo.

·        The ship was released after a sum ransom was paid by the Japanese owner.THE RESPONSE OF THE UN AND IMO FOR THE PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA:

·        In 2005, the growing number of reported attacks on ships off the coast of Somalia prompted the IMO assembly to adopt a resolution  (A.979(24)), which first brought the matter to the attention of the UN Security Council .

·        This action resulted in a UN security council presidential statement, issued on 15 march 2006, encouraging UN member states with naval vessels and military aircraft operating in international waters and air space adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant for piracy incidents and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping.

·        At a meeting in London, also in july 2007 IMO secretary general briefed UN secretary general , on the situation, in particular on the impact that acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships may have on human life, the safety of navigation and the environment, and requested his support.

·        On 20^th Aug 2007 , the UN security council adopted resolution 1772 on the situation in Somalia , in which , it stressed its concern at the upsurge in piracy off the Somali coast.

·        In June 2008 UN adopted resolution 1816 unanimously, the security council decided that , following receipt of a letter from Somalia to the president of UN security council giving the consent of Somalia ‘s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), states cooperating with the TFG would be allowed , for a period of 6 months, to enter the country’s territorial water and use all necessary means to repress the acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.

·        In October 2008 UN security council adopted another resolution 1838 , in which , the UN secretary general has pledged his support for an extension of the anti piracy mandate.

·        On December 2008 the United Nations Security council adopted resolution 1846, which states that for 12 months from December 2008, states and regional organizations  cooperating with Somali Transitional Federal Government may enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use all necessary means to fight piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalia coast, in accordance with relevant international law.

THE PERMANENT SOLUTION TO BRING AN END TO THE PIRACY OFF SOMALIA COULD BE:

·        The immediate solution would be the coordinated international action is the only mechanism likely to bring any lasting relief to this troubled and lawless area.

·        U.N must take measures to form a strong and stable govt in Somalia which can enforce the law strictly to bring an end for the violence and chaos on the land and piracy at sea.

·        Measures to be taken towards politico –economic stabilization of Somalia, which would also create greater employment opportunities for its people.

·        Measures to be taken to develop better education opportunities which in turn will  provide employment opportunities    

·        Assistance to be provided to Somalia for building up its maritime zones, which is currently nonexistent.

·        Such capacity building assistance for maritime law enforcement would also need to be extended to the adjoining countries.

·        However, owing to the considerable lead time involved in bringing up a strong govt, economy, employment and peace, involving capable naval forces of major powers would be indispensable in dealing with piracy.